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THE RURAL BANKING' SYSTEM: _NEED FOR REFORMS
I • Zntroductlon
The rural banking system. (RBS) which has extensive
network in the rural areas certainly plays a big role in
proviOing the agricultural sector financial services.
Wi_h a wellT functioning rural banking system, the
aurrentl_ renewed emphasis on agricultural development
should rind few obstacles. Unfortunately, however, the
rural• banking •system is currently fighting for its Own
survival° While they were adjusting to _he new policy
environment initiate0 in 1980, an ecOnomia crisis
unpre=edented in the country 's post_war history struck
in the middle of 19B3. It has seriously affected the
viability of most rural banks. The subJequent mist in
policy which includes, among others, _he use of merket-
re lated redis count taxes, sha rp redu orion in
rediscounting and withdrawal of tax exe_ptlons, has
further aggravated their p£oblems.
Several questions immediately come to our mind.
Under an entirely different policy envir0_ment, do
rural banks have a ro_e to play in this .renewed
.emphasis on agricultural development? If so, what •
measures should be taken to rehabilitate the rural
banking system and assure itssurvival under this new
competitive environment?
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This paper basically addresses those questions.
The next s•ecti_ reviews important finanQial policies
and. performance of the rural banking system. Section
ZTI disausses • possible roles of the RBS under •this
competitive environment. The last sect ion presents some
measures to rehabilitate and strengthen the RBSo
ZI° Review of Financial Policies. and Performance of _.he
aural, sankin • System
Rural banks may well be considered as •S4pp!y
leading institutions. Their Creation was primarily
intended to provide folks in the rural areas access to
•financial services which financial institutions located
in the urban areas _ailed to provide. The .fairly iwide
distribution of rural, banks in the countryside c_Id
enhance people's savings efforts and, at the same time,
generate "favorable expectational and. pSy cholOgica 1
effects on entrepreneurs.•" Since at the initial stage
rural banks may not operate profitably, the government
provided them substantial direct and indirect subsidies
(see Table I) ° It is, noteworthy that no timeframe for
the withdrawal of these, subsidies had been
-stipulated. Thus.. rural, _anks have considered _m_st of
them aa permanent features in their operatiC_1o
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.Rural .Banks were designed to be small. In _he first
pla.oe, they were made unit banks. - Their growth
Ehe-refOre, has _o •depend on the growth of the area they
are serving. Secondly, they were permitted to lend only
tO small farmers who have 50 hectares of land or less
dedi=eted to agricultural production and to small
mer_hanEs and small business enterprises whose capital
invesEmsnts do not exceed Pio0.O00o And lastly, tax
policies tend to reward small banks and penalize big
banks.
The low interest rate policy from the 50s up to the
70S was primarily aimed at stimu faring investment.
Savings mobili&ation was thus put to the background.
For rural banks, At means that they have to take. the
responsibility of protecting small farmers and
entrepreneurs from "loansharks " . Sinue the low
interest rate policy had served as a disincenEive to
8avlng, rural banks had to operate with severely lJ.m.i, ted
loana ble funds. Unmet credit demands, therefore, still
had to go to the informal credit market°
The introdu orion oT new farm technology in the
se_d half of the 60s and ,the 70s substantially altered
the agriou_tural credit policy ot government from _e of
I
merely protecting small _armers into one of in'=reasing
agricu ltural output. Aside from a_uiring knowledge
ab_t the new technology , additional working ¢ap italwas
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needed so that farmers can adopt the new farm
technology. Since small farmers usually reali:e only
little savings from their farm income_ l_e additional
working ,capital has tO come from the credit market.
Instead of leaving to the rural banks _he task of
meeting new credit demands _hrough increased savings
mobilip-ationv_wnich admittedly could take a long time
since interest rates on deposits were relatively
u_ttractivev_the Central Bank has _ried to mast the
increased credit demand partly through money creation,
pertly by taxing commercial banks (e.g. P.D. 717), and
l_rtly by _rrowing abroad. The rural banks are made as
conduits of _heee funds. There is no doubt that this
policy has contributed to the rapid adoptico _f new
farm technology, and hence, increased agricu It_ ra 1
output o However, it has completely changed the
character ot rural banks. With _he relatively
attractive spread between rediscount and lending rates
which is supposed to cover administrative cost and
credit risk _ rural banks became increasingly dependent
on borrowings from the Central Bank. In the 700, the
central Bank vigorously pursued the policy of hav_ng a
rural bank for each town. One of the objective.s _as to
make the adoption of new farm technology more widespread
by making cheap credit accessible to more farmers,
especia11¥ small ones. This has resulted An the
proliferation of rural banks even in marginal areas
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where it is £mpossible to have a viable rural _n_.
w£thou_ substantial 9overnment and Central Bank support,
•The 1960 financial reforms have emphasi_e0
efficiency _rough competitlon. Barriers to co_qpetltio_
which were• legally i_posed have been removed. _v•ing_
moDilizetioo has to J_ stressed rather _han Dorrowin_&
from _h@ Central Bank. All finanolal institutions are
expected to adopt ._he posture of a real tir_nciai
•intermed.iary. For rural _nks to be oompetltive in the
new environment, capital build_up has _een encourage_,
However, rural ban_ s_ill continued Lo en_Oy _he same
Central Bank snd 9over_men_ support. Hence, they
preferred to remain malnly as conduits of Central _ank
funOs _a_her than intermediaries intermedis_i_ between
surplus _nd deficit units in view 0% pro%i_
oppor%_ni_ies in this _ctivity. _ ls _nderst6n_able
_hen t_8_ _hei_ a D_l_y _o ds_ive_ o_edlt _O t_e
agrlo_ l_u_al sector l_g_e ly depends o_ CB'
rediscoun_in% pol_c¥.
T_e rural bankin_ system w_S t_dl, y _%_@=t, eO _ _]_
economi= crisis _h_t st_k An 198_. A io_ o_ the_._
_orrowe_s were un_Dle to repa_ _hei_ Ioa_s, and _he_ i:_
_urn were piling up _r_e_ra_es wi_h _;he Ce_al _an_
The switch to _rke_v_e fated r_disGoun_ r_, s_>
re(}uo_ion in_he VOI_ Of _e_iSoo_n_iIl_ wl_h ._:t_,@
Cen_rs1 B_nk, and sudde_ _i_nO_l o_ ._x _x_t_£o_
are ms_:l_e_ surprises _ha_; we_'e not; _J,_y an_,oip_'_ed 1_7
- 6 -
rural banks. A0justments to this new policy environment
would certainly be •more difficult than if they were
predicted and properly discounted by the rural banks.
Perhaps it is worthwhile at this point to refer to
some data aDout the financial performance of the rural
banking system. Table II gives the system's sources o_
_unds. Deposits used to be their main source of fun4s.
Star_ing in 1974, however, the RB8 tended to re_ more
on CB borrowings. This occurred at the time when the CB
intensified further its support to the agricultural
sector through its various re0iscounting window. Note
that deposits per rural Dank have been increasing,
indicating the success of rural banks in mobilizing
savings in the countryside. The growth rates i;_
deposits per Dank were particularly higher during the
floating interest rate regime. This may indicate the
potentials of mobilizing savings in the countryside
since surplus units respond to incentives. The growth
rates in the capital accounts per bank were also
significantly higher _uring the float_.ng interest rate
regime compared to the previous years. This may De one
indication of the e_orts o_ rural banMs to position
themselves in an increasingly competitive environment.
Note, however, that even a_ter the financial reforms,
CB Dorrowings still constituted a major source of funds
for rural banks.
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The performance of rural banking system in terms o_
increasing its total resources pales in comparison with
those of other banking institutions. The share of rural
banking system in the total resources of the banking
system has been declining (see Table XII).
The rural banking system is the least successful in
mobilizing savings among banking institutions (see Table
IV). The share of its deposits in total deposits of the
banking system has been shrinking. Its reliance on CB
borrowings is •more conspicuous than that of the
commerciai and thrift banking systems (see Table V).
The profitability o_ the rural banking system had
baen consistently declining over the past few years (see
Table VI). However, it had been consis_enly higher
_han those ot the co_r_nercial and thrift banking systems.
Its ROI (7.8%) in 1984 was higher than that of the
commercial banking system (5.2%), but lower than that ot
the thrift banking system (10.4%). It should however De
noted that the favorable performance of the RBS in this
respect coul_ be attributed mainly to the substantial CE
anO government subsidies it had received.
The 1985 financial performance of the rural banking
System will likely De bleaker because of substantial
reduction of their lending activities. In 1984,
arrearages with the Central Bank already reached at
unprecedented levels constituting about 72 percent of
their outstanding rediscounts (see Table VII). They
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will probably have to scale down their lending
operations, and since agricultural loans usually
constitute about 80 percent o_ their loan portfolio,
their reduced lending operations will certainly nave
severe consequences on the f low of credit to th_
agricultural sector.
.III. ReneweO .Emphasis on Agricultura_l_Develop_ment and the
Role ot the Rural Banking System
The renewed emphasis on agricultural development is
anchored on the belie_ that the agricultural sector will
assume the leading role in the •economic recovery.
However, the current approach adopted to stimulate the
agricultural sector substantially differs from the
previous • one. Whereas before, the agricultural sector
used to be pampered with subsidies, the current approach
to agricultural development is market,oriented. Prices
O_ both the agricultural •products and _actor inputs will
be fully deregulated and subsidies be phased out.
Under this framework, it is hoped that resources would
freely Glow into the agricultural sector in view of the
relative attractiveness of this economic activity.
These reforms are accompanied with changes in
monetary and credit policies. Whereas before selective
credit policies were stressed , the recent policy will
focus on the use of monetary instruments for
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stabilization purposes. Although Central Bank credit
woul_ still flow into the agricultural sector as well as
to other sectors, this time the flow will be dictated by
the market. The rediscounting rate will eventually De
based on the prevailing market rate.
Under this new policy framework, rural banks woul_
lose their most important source of revenue, i.e.
Central Bank suDsidies through rediscounting. To remain
in the market, they have to transform themselves from
mere conduits o_ CB funds into real financial
intermediaries. •Like any other financial intermediary,
the rural banks' main role is to stimulate saving in
the countryside by offering surplus units a highez
return on their savings than they would realize through
selfvfinanceO investment and to allocate funds to the
most proOuctive activities,
The continuation ot the operations of rural banks
is indeed very important. Their wide distribution in
the country side would •assure the continuous flow o_
intermediated funds to agriculture and agricu Iture ,-
related activities. Moreover, their familiarity with
the economic conditions in the areas where they are
operating and their stock ••of @information regarding the
potentials of various economic activities in the
locality and personal characters of prospective
borrowers would allow them to make a better assessment
o_ the risk and return o£ prospective economic projects.
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In this case, rural banks would not tend to overestimate
the risk of socially desirable projects_ hence, the cost
of loans will likely not be higher than their true
social cost. If banks currently existing in the rural
areas ceased to operate, other financial institutions
will be less inclined to enter the area where no other
financial institutions operate, except the rural bank.
The aOverse consequences on agriculture =redit would
likely be felt, unless the informal credit market fully
picks up the slack.
The specific roles that rural banks will have to
play in this new policy environment Oepends on the kind
of relationship they would have with other financial
institutions, notably big commercial banks. It may be
worthwhile to explore some of the possible relationships.
(i } Rural banks may be directly competing with
other financial institutions in a locality
both in the deposit and loan marke_s. In this
regard, the size of a rural bank is very
important since it determines its ability to
compete with other financial institutions,
especially branches of commercial banks.
(2) Rural banks may not be directly competing with
other financial institutions. That is, rural
banks may opt to specialize in servicing small
clients (e.g., small rice and corn farmers),
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while Dranches of commercial banks may cater
to the needs of big clients (e0g., sugar and
banana planters ) in the same region • Of
course, their comparative advantage should
dictate their choice.
(3) Rural banks and commercial banks may perform
comp le mentary functions. Tn this case, a
formal tievup, either permanent or temporary,
may De forged between rural and commercial
banks so that the latter can participate in
agriculture credit even if they 40 not have
the same extensive market penetration as rural
banks. For example, commercial banks may
place deposits at rural banks at relatively
attractive rates. The latter, in turna onr
lend them to local borrowers. Thust commercial
ba_ks act as wholesalers while rural banks act
as retailers. There• are a lot of wo_kin_
arrangements that could be worked out between
the two _inancial institutions, Dut what is
important is that funds flow to the rural
banks to augment the funds they have mobilized
in their own locality.
•(4) Rural banks may become branches or
8uDsidiaries o_ commercial banks. In this
regard, UCPB' s experience may be worth
. 12-
mentioning. It has "infused in some 16 rural
banks and four thrift Danks nationwide a total
of P145 million in additional capital". Aside
from increasing the capital base of these
banks, UCPB has also int rodu ced
professionalism in the management of bank' s
resources by training the local bank owners
and managers. Thus, the additional skills of
local managers, their stock of information
about local conditions and personal characters
of potential clients, . and the increased
capital base are blended together to make
those rural and thrift banks truly competltive
in the countryside.
IV. Some Suggestions for Rehabi!itatinglthe Rura! Bankinq
SY stem
The discussions above have pointed out the
possible " roles of rural banks in maintaining or
increasing the flow of credit to the agricultural
sector under the new policy framework. However, the
present predicament of rural banks is indeed a big
hindrance for them to play such roles in the future.
Because Of their very limited network an_ the
concentration of their operations in urban centers,
other banking institutions are in no position to
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substitute the rural banks ..even in the near future. It
is, therefore, necessary to rehabilitate the _rurai
banking system and allow them to adjust smoothly to the
Dew policy environment. The following are some
suggestions for rehabilitating the banking system.
(I) Restructurin_ of Arreara_es
According to a. TBAC- study, .about 80 percent o_
total operating rural banks .cannot participate in
government programs due to arrears with the Central.
Bank. Eighty (80) percent of total arrearages can be
attributed to defaulted, loans of borrowers. To help
banks ad just to the new policy environment, the
proposed lOyyear restructuring scheme, which would
include a fiveyyear moratorium on the payment of loan
principal should be considered seriously. However, in
view of the policy of government to strengthen the
rural banking system, the restructuring of arrearage8
has to be applied selectively. The set of criteria
for restructuring arrearages of individual banks snoulc_
include the followinq_ . (a) integrity of bank
_ar_agement; (b) agricultural output potentials of th_
area• where the rural bank is operating; (c) banks _
deposit • growth potentials ; (d) fulfillment of the
required minimum net worth to risk assets ratio; and
(e) potentials for broadening the capital base.
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privilege should, however, be withdrawn after a certain
period.
(3) Broadenin_ the•Capital Base
Broadening the capital base of rural banks should
be encouraged. It may be accomplished in at least
three, not mutually exclusive, ways.
a) Internal Capital Buildvu_. A TBAC study
shows the eagerness of bank owners to increase
capitalization in order to continue operation after
the economic crisis struck. This may not De ' a
widespread practice, but it still shows some
positive slgns. There are reasons why bank owners
may not want to infuse additional capital to their
banks. One possible reason is that the withdrawal
of tax exemptions has consistently reduced bank
profits •which could have been ploughed back. Our
suggestion to gradually phase out the tax
exemptions may encourage bank _ners to increase
bank capitalization by ploughing back profits.
Another possible reason is that the 20 percent
ceiling on individual/family group stoekholdihg in
a rural bank provides a disincentive tO
stockholders who might want to increase their
shares. In view ot the need to increase
capitalization of rural banks in order to continue
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operation and stay compet_.tive, the ceiling may be
increased to-50 percent provided that it is
accompllshed . through infusion Of new money, not
through buying the shares of other BtoQkholders.
Still another reason is 4_h. _ _e_ on
virtually risklese CB and Treasury Bills which are
deflnitely more attractive than the yields on bank
8hares. This is a maCEoeconomio problem that must
be approached from a more cOmprehenelve view.
i
However, At is important to point out here that the
high interest rates on those seQuritiee may have
also siphoned off caplta_ that could have been used
to increase rural bank capitaliration.
(b) Attrac_in_ .External Funds. This may involve
selling shares to potential stockholders° However,
the presence of high.yielding CB and Treasury Bi11$
would give rural banks difficulty in selllng their
shares unless they guarantee equivalent yield. One
feasible alternative is to encourage rural banks to
sell shares, either preferred or common, to
commercial banks. The investments of commercial
banks on those shares may qualify a8 part of the
mandatory requirement stipulated in PoD0 717. This
may be less onerous to commercial banks° At the
same time, it would give them a mechanism to find
out the economic oppo_tunitie8 available in the
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rural areas.
(c)- Merger_Consolidation. This has been stressed in
the 1980 financial reforms as one of the means of
broadening the capital base o£ rural banks.
Perhaps, the experience o£ the First Consolidated
Rural Bank of Bohol with regard to consolida_iOn
can De examined and shared with other rural, bank8




EXEMPTIONS AND PRIVILEGES OF RURAL BANKS
'=
!
Taxes,e_-ges anefees1/ Ot,'_rs FromO_traZ _ nora_ Gov't:,_¢ies
I
[,
1. Income Tax banks2/ 1. From registration fees, 1. Free technical assist- 1. A_vice on Business and2. Fixed tax for charges and documentary anoe i farm m_mgement by
3. Documentary stamp tax stamps on any instru- I 2. Free training of bank other gov't, agencies
4. Tax on income of banks mant relati_ to trans- I officers 2. Co%u_texpartfund fram
5. Fireazms tax act/ons or loans 3. Free from management the Development Bank of
6. Deposit interest tax extended by the _B.• ta]r_ expemses the Philippines
7._al Prope_yTax 2.Frompublicationin I4.Umn byCBto_ on 3.n_e notarialservice
8. All local tax (such as transfer newspapers of fore- ,' col/ateral of assets on doe,amirs by munici-
tax, b,d_ding permit fee, mum/- closure notices where ; of _B, in _ies pal and city judges
cipal secretary's fee, market the principal of the and financial crisis 4. Borrowings from the
fees or rentals, tolls for roads, loan and interest due 5. Loan to _B through CB Development Bank of the
bridges and canals, pemit to do not exceed of fundslfrom inter- Philippines
engage in business and residence 910,000.00. nat/onal_iil_!ng 5. Com_mory deposit
tax} except for the annual busi- I institu_'ons insurance co_ara_
ness tax 6. Redi_ of STD 6. O_antee coverage of
9. Property registration fees Funds from (_ oertain supervised
I0. Docketing fees, sheriff's fee
ii. Regulation fees for motor
vehicles I
12. Fees to-the Securities and
E_ge Comm_,_n
I
i/_ applies o_y whennet_ _ o=m_-t do_ not_=,eapm_._wer, if it exceeUsPm _t does,ot.
go beyond P3M, the taxes, charges or+-fees shall be levied in progc¢+_i_ to that Said excess bears to the net assets.
When net assets exDeeds _3M, the RB shall pay all taxes, fees andS.
i
2/Fixed tax of _2,000.00 shall be coll_ted form banks, insurance companies_ finance and investment ocmpanies, doing
bus_ness in the ?l'ilippinesand fre_nc_isegrantees .(Sec. 192 gg). Fixed taxes ih the Natior__ Internal Revenue Code




RURAL BANKS' SOURCES OF FUNDS
De_osi£s F B_rr0w_ngs Capital Accounts .
Year No. of RBs No. of RBs No. of RBs
1972 544839.2 395939.0 487309.6
1973 699044.5 611464.9 514331.2
(28.3) (54.4) (5.5.)
1974 821022.7 1454545.4 532670.4
(17.4) (137.9) (3.6)
1975 882812.5 1940104.1 554687.5
(7.5) (33.4) (4.1)
1976 1062111.8 1903105.5 619875.7
(20._) (-1.9) (11.8)
1977 1211764.7 1860000.0 644705.8
(14.1) (_2.3) (4.0)
1978 1387755.1 2070891.5 675617.6
(14.5) (i1.3) (4.8)
1979 1580838.3 2395209.5 706586.8
(13.9) (15.7) (4.6)
1980 1646317.8 2710271.3 731589.1
(4.1) (13.2) (3.5)
1981 1974038.4 3104807.6 850000.0
(19.9) (14.6) (16.2)
1982 2489835.4 3804453.0 979670.8
(26.1) (22.5) (15.2)
1983 2978095.2 4209523.8 1158095.2
(19.6) (10.6) (18,2)
Note: Figures in parentheses are growth rates.
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines
TABLE III
DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH RATES OF RESOURCES OF BANKING INSTITUTIONS
(IN PERCENT)
f
Banking System 0BM) 80380.0 96666.0 123276.0 157024.8 193559.2 228580.0 276056.6 330943.4 403700.4
(20.3) (27.5) (27.4) (23.3) (18.1) (20.8) (19.9) (22.0)
Commercial Banks 73.8 72.9 74.3 74.8 74.6 74.8 74.1 75.0 74.1
(18.7) (30.0) (28.2) (22.9) (18.3} (19.7) (21.4) (20.5)
Thrift Banks 3.8 4.2 4.5 4.9 5.4 4.2 4.5 4.9 3.7
(34.9) (37.4) (36.9) (37.6) (-8.1) (29.5) (28.3) (-7.9)
Rural Banks 3.8 3.4 3.3 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.9 2,8 2.2
(i0.2) (21.3) (21.9) (12.3) (17.5) (22.9) (16.9
Specla)/zed Gov't Banks 18.6 19.4 17.9 17.2 17.1 i8.2 18.5 17.3 20.0
(25.4) (17.2) (22.4) (22.8) (25.3) (22.9) (12.1) (41.3)
i r -- •
Note, Figures in parenthesesare rats.
Source: Fact Book, _ Financial system (various Issues)
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TABLE IV
DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH RATES OF DEPOSITS OF BANKING INSTITUTIONS
(IN PERCENT)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
_ /
Banking System {_M) 34666.0 42506.3 54343.0 69780.5 89498.2 99594.2 119364.5 142181.7 153400.8
(22.6) (27.8) (28.4) (28.2) (II.3) (19.8} (19.1) (7.9)
co_ercL_ Banks 78.2 80.7 81.5 81.5 81.5 80.6 81.8 84.8 90.i
(26.5) (29.2) (28.3) (28.2) (I0.1) (21.7) (23.4) (14.7)
Tnrift Banks 6.9 7.7 8.5 9.0 8.9 7.0 7.8 7.8 4.5
(37.5) (39.9) (36.6) (26.9} (-12.7) (33.3) (20.2) (38.4)
Rural Banks 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 1.9
(21.I) (25.4) (22.5) (7.3) (20.9) (25.3) (21.6) (-8.6)
Specialized Gov't Banks 12.4 9.1 7.6 7.2 7.7 10.3 8.2 5.2 3.5
(11.0) (6.4) (21.9) (37.0} (49.2) (-4.7) (-24.9) (-26.5)
m r
Note: Fi_ in pe/e_theses are growth rates.
Source: Fact Book, Philippige Financial STsta_ (Various Ism__-_
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TABLE V
RATIO OF LOANS TO DEPOSITS
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
r
Banking System 1.49 1.44 1.43 1.44 1.34 1.40 1.38 1.44 1.53
Comercial Banks 1.41 1.28 1.32 1.32 1.22 1.29 1.23 1.28 1.12
Thrift Banks 0.85 0.87 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.87 0.86 0.96 1.38
Rural Banks 3.00 2.68 2.59 2.57 2.69 2.60 2.53 2.39 2.38
Specialized Gov't Banks 2.06 2.89 2.92 3.24 2.95 2.36 3.10 4.35 N.A.
N.A. = Not Available
Source: Fact Bookt Philippine Financial System (Various Issues)
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TABLE VI
RATIO OF NET INCOME TO GROSS OPERATING INCOME,
SELECTED YEARS
Comme rcial ' Thr-l_ _ ...... Rural
Year Bank s Bank s Bank s Toga 1
1978 18.I 7.7 T'_,_ 16.5
1979 14.1 8.0 19.1 12.6
1980 i0.6 6.6 14.5 9.9
1981 8.1 (5.0) 14.1 7.1
1982 6.7 6.6 12.1 6.3
1983 8.0 5.7 10.1 6.9
1984 3.6 6.4 9.3 5.4
i f I I f • F _il li'( I I'f --
Sources Central Bank of the Philipplnes.
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TABLE VII
RURAL BA_S' REDISCOUNTING ARREARAGES WITH "
THE CENTRAL BANK, 1979_1984
Illfi rf Ili_ll_-- Iil/ I _r
.......... Ib C_nge
Period Anm_n_ Over P_at Duo
Previous Year Ratio (%)
in_ unl -- I • -- • _ ....n nm -- -
I. As ot end December
1979 570 • 0 28 • 0
1980 720.0 2b. 3 28.5
1981 870.0 20.8 29.4
1982 960.0 10.3 26.3
1983 1201 • 7 25 • 2 29 • 9
1984 2579 • 1 114,5 72.2
II. 1984 Selected Months
June 1984 1748.4 46.8
Sep_ 1984 2249.6 61.2
Oc_ 1984 2370.7 85.5
Dec 1984 2579.1 72.2
_-i / / .....
S(_.lrce: T_%C (1985)
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